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ORGANISMS AND MANUFACTURES: ON THE HISTORY 
OF PLANT INVENTIONS 
ALAIN POTTAGE∗ AND BRAD SHERMAN† 
[This article examines the nature of the invention in intellectual property law. Taking the United 
States’ Plant Patent Act of 1930 as its central focus, it explores the terms in which the compatibility 
of biological inventions with the modern paradigm of the invention was debated in the first part of 
the 20th century. The questions addressed in the debates leading up to the enactment of the Plant 
Patent Act of 1930 — what kinds of plant qualified as patentable subject matter; what exactly did a 
breeder have to do in order to qualify as an inventor; and what was the relationship between the act 
of invention and the act of reproducing the invention — were ultimately questions about the 
consistency of ideas and the nature of manufacture, the answers to which are as pertinent today as 
they were some 80 years ago. We argue that in answering these questions, the traditional notion of 
the invention was redefined. Whereas traditional utility patents were based on the assumption that 
the only actor able to exercise agency in relation to the development of a novel invention was the 
human inventor, the regime of plant patents acknowledged that nature played a key role in the 
creation of new plant varieties. By altering the concept of agency that underpins the inventive 
process within patent law, plant patent law fundamentally changed the way that the invention was 
configured. In particular, whereas mechanical inventors were inventors at the beginning, breeders 
were inventors after the fact. At the same time, plant patent law also reversed the roles normally 
played by the participants involved in the creation of the invention. Under traditional patent 
doctrine, nature provided the material which was then shaped into an invention by the human 
inventor. In the case of plant patents, nature did the inventing, and the breeder was relegated to the 
task of identifying and then reproducing nature’s creations. One of the consequences of this is that 
breeders did not create a new genetic principle — instead, they inductively appropriated a natural 
event. This changed the premise of invention — invention became an inductive rather than an 
originating act. Using the doctrinal requirement of enablement as a case study, we show how the 
reconfiguration of the invention had and continues to have important ramifications for the way that 
plant inventions, as with biological inventions more generally, are dealt with by intellectual property 
law.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
Although critical attention is more often directed to the role of patents in such 
things as stem cell research, pharmaceuticals or human cloning, an exploration of 
the geographical and historical trajectories of plant inventions remains a produc-
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tive (and under-exploited) approach to the study of biological invention. Trans-
genic plants are the most widely travelled and cosmopolitan embodiments of 
biotechnological ingenuity.1 They originate in the laboratories of agricultural 
biotechnology corporations and are exported to markets in diverse parts of the 
globe. Even the relatively minor displacement from the laboratory to the fields of 
North American farmers has raised difficult questions for intellectual property 
law. In Canada, for example, patents relating to transgenic plants cannot claim 
the modified plants as exemplars of a new variety; they can only claim the gene 
construct that confers the desired trait upon each plant.2 As a result, courts have 
had to consider whether — or to what extent — a patent controlling the use and 
reproduction of the gene construct also controls the use and reproduction of the 
whole plant.3 They have also had to consider how the respective contributions of 
biotechnological ingenuity and biological process should be quantified. What are 
the limits of ‘manufacture’? The material substance of the plant is qualified by 
two distinct modes of creation and reproduction, and patent doctrine can only 
reconcile these principles of origin by recourse to crude pragmatism: to repro-
duce the plant is necessarily to reproduce the construct that it ‘embodies’. So 
plant inventions — precisely because the patent effectively claims a whole 
organism rather than an isolated gene sequence or metabolic mechanism of 
action4 — press home a question that is posed only implicitly or obliquely by 
other kinds of biotechnological invention:5 where does natural process end and 
‘invention’ begin? 
Transgenic plants are not designed or bred entirely de novo: the basic tech-
nique of modification consists in adding a specific trait or competence to a 
variety produced by ‘natural’ processes of breeding and selection.6 Commercial 
breeding programmes are dependent on access to genetic resources that are 
drawn from many diversity-rich parts of the world, often in the South, and which 
are maintained ex situ in public seed banks.7 As a result, the agronomic value of 
elite varieties (in terms of yield performance) is essentially a function of their 
cosmopolitan nature — it is estimated that even the most genealogically uncom-
plicated variety will be composed of at least 30 parent lines.8 Transgenic 
modification often adds nothing more than a protective packaging to this 
 
 1 See generally Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic 
World (2004); Lucile H Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British 
Royal Botanic Gardens (2002). 
 2 Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser [2004] 1 SCR 902, 914 (McLachlin CJ and Fish J), 941 
(Arbour J) (‘Schmeiser’). 
 3 See ibid 918, 931 (McLachlin CJ and Fish J), 954 (Arbour J). 
 4 Ibid 921, 932 (McLachlin CJ and Fish J), 956 (Arbour J). 
 5 In the United States, there is still no settled judicial view as to how biological inventions can be 
reconciled with the written description requirement of US patent law. See generally Joseph M 
Manak, ‘The Law of Written Description in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Patents’ (2004) 
23 Biotechnology Law Report 30. 
 6 For a general discussion: see Jack Brown and Peter Caligari, An Introduction to Plant Breeding 
(2007, forthcoming). 
 7 For a general discussion see: A H D Brown et al, The Use of Plant Genetic Resources (1989). 
 8 Timothy Swanson and Timo Goeschl, ‘Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor 
Countries of Technological Enforcement within the Biotechnology Sector’ in Keith E Maskus 
and Jerome H Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (2005) 669, 673. 
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complex product. An elite variety produced by selective breeding has a typical 
lifespan of five to seven years,9 which is about the amount of time it takes for 
species of insect or bacteria to adapt themselves to resistances bred into the 
variety. So plant breeders are engaged in continuous breeding programmes with 
the objective of finding ever new kinds of resistant strain. Biotechnology allows 
resistances to pests and diseases to be engineered into the elite variety, either by 
means of a gene that confers resistance to a specific pathogen, or to a proprietary 
herbicide or pesticide. So transgenic plants, including those that are protected by 
‘genetic use restriction technologies’ (‘GURTs’), merely bundle up the same 
cosmopolitan source lines that are found in conventional varieties, with the lines 
being drawn from either the public domain as it existed before genetic resources 
became subject to state sovereignty, or some sovereign jurisdiction. By what 
principle of accounting should one recognise these different contributions? To 
what extent do proprietary transgenic plants enclose essentially public resources? 
Legal instruments such as the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture attempt to address these questions,10 but their effec-
tiveness is compromised by the fact that there are not only too many claims to 
ownership in play, but also too many conceptions of ownership. 
The fundamental problem is that plant inventions — whether conventional or 
transgenic — compress diverse economic, cultural, and legal contexts. A single 
plant is an index to many different principles of origination, many potential 
owners, and many different modes of scientific or therapeutic knowledge. And 
biotechnology has played a leading role in this process of global expansion and 
cultural diffraction. The case of ‘biopiracy’ or ‘bioprospecting’ is a good 
illustration. In the classic form of bioprospecting, biotechnology corporations 
exploit indigenous ethnobotanical knowledge to identify plants with promising 
pharmaceutical potential. In the rare cases in which bioprospecting pays real 
dividends, the plants are reduced to chemical compounds and then packaged and 
patented as pharmaceuticals.11 Natural products research, as a specific mode of 
biotechnological research, sets up a long and convoluted chain of relatedness 
between laboratory science and indigenous knowledge. Of course, bioprospect-
ing practices were prevalent well before the rise of biotechnology, and it is 
arguable that these practices always generated new kinds of cultural mixture.12 
However, whereas these forms of cultural complexity could once have been 
externalised by the patent system, they now have to be absorbed into the 
doctrinal explanation of patent rights.13 Bioprospecting not only forces different 
economies of knowledge into proximity, in doing so it also complicates the 
 
 9 Ibid. 
 10 Opened for signature 3 November 2001, [2006] ATS 10 (entered into force 29 June 2004). 
 11 See, eg, Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee, ‘Beyond Authorship: Reconfiguring Rights in 
Traditional Culture and Bioknowledge’ in Mario Biagioli and Peter Galison (eds), Scientific 
Authorship: Credit and Intellectual Property in Science (2003) 195, 200. 
 12 See Schiebinger, above n 1. 
 13 This is a direct product of both the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 
June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993), and the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, opened for signature 3 November 2001, 
[2002] ATNIF 14 (entered into force 29 June 2004), which attempt to integrate the use of plant 
genetic resources and intellectual property law. 
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Western doctrinal conception of ‘inventorship’. What is in question is not just 
the entitlement of indigenous peoples as the custodians or cultivators of the plant 
material, but also their entitlement as the ‘authors’ or ‘breeders’ of these plants. 
This kind of authorship cannot be easily explained in terms of the familiar 
Western conception of technical innovation or justified in terms of notions of 
economic and social utility; rather, intellectual property law must experiment 
with elements of authorship that are drawn from discourses such as human 
rights.14 
What one sees in these examples is the diffraction of plants into a number of 
distinct legal entities, and although this process is driven by economic, political 
and technical forces that are specific to plant inventions, there is a sense in which 
these complexities express a tension that is common to all biological inventions. 
The lines along which plant inventions fall apart can be retraced to the basic 
doctrinal distinction between intangible and tangible, form and matter, or idea 
and embodiment. The contemporary complexity of plant inventions arises from 
the fact that the dimension of the intangible is diffracted into multiple principles 
of origination or authorship, which in turn divide the material form of the plant 
into multiple embodiments. In modern patent law, the distinction between the 
mental and the material was stabilised by a number of mutually-reinforcing 
manoeuvres: the reduction of the inventive idea to text; the separation of the 
dimension of the invention from the process of manufacturing and marketing; 
and the consequent reduction of material form to a mere embodiment of the 
invention.15 The trouble with biological inventions is that they cannot be easily 
divided into such neat, mutually exclusive registers: the metabolic processes of 
living organisms cannot be reduced to anything resembling an engineering 
blueprint, so the inventive idea cannot be clearly delineated and distinguished 
from the process in which it intervenes. The idea is not reducible to text, but 
remains embedded in, and animated by, the tissues in which it is expressed, and 
as the Schmeiser decision suggests, it is impossible to say where the formative 
power of the idea ends and where natural biological process begins. Patent law 
may be committed to making the distinction between ideas and embodiments, 
but as a result, it is compelled to search within the texture of the invention for a 
dividing line that can ultimately only be a line of its own making. Hence, the 
endless diffraction of the invention itself. 
In this article, we explore the question of invention and animate embodiments 
by retracing the historical — as opposed to the geographical — trajectory of 
patents for invented plants. To this end, we re-examine both the United States’ 
Plant Patent Act of 1930,16 and more generally, the historical period in which it was 
enacted, when, as now, the compatibility of biological inventions with the modern 
paradigm of the ‘invention’ was being explored. The questions addressed in the 
debates leading up to the enactment of the US Plant Patent Act of 1930 — what 
 
 14 See Rosemary Coombe, ‘Works in Progress: Traditional Knowledge, Biological Diversity, and 
Intellectual Property in a Neoliberal Era’ in Richard W Perry and Bill Maurer (eds), Globaliza-
tion under Construction: Governmentality, Law and Identity (2003) 273. 
 15 See generally Mario Biagioli, ‘Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights 
and Authors’ (2006) 73 Social Research 1129, 1143. 
 16 Pub L No 245, 46 Stat 376. For the current version: see 35 USC §§ 161–4 (2000 & Supp IV, 2005). 
     
2007] Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant Inventions 543 
     
kinds of plant qualified as patentable subject matter; what exactly did a breeder 
have to do in order to qualify as an inventor; and what was the relationship 
between the act of invention and the act of reproducing the invention — were 
ultimately questions about the consistency of ideas and the nature of manufac-
ture, the answers to which are as pertinent today as they were some 80 years ago. 
I I   MECHANISING NATURE 
In historical accounts, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 is often presented as a kind 
of parallel to the scheme of utility patents — plant inventions were crudely 
compared with mechanical and chemical inventions, but the differences between 
manufactures and organisms were still too marked to allow the inclusion of 
plants in the general patent statute: 
social agents failed in their attempts simply to amend the utility patent statutes 
to include plants. Instead, a sui generis statute was created, one which allowed 
lax descriptions of the invention, a liberal policy regarding discoveries, and no 
clear indication that the new plant variety constituted an improvement over ex-
isting ones.17 
The Plant Patent Act of 1930 extended patents to plants, but it did so only by 
analogy, establishing a species of patent right that addressed plant inventions as 
exceptions or approximations to mechanical or chemical inventions. In this 
reading of history, the Act was eclipsed by the decision of the US Supreme Court 
in Diamond v Chakrabarty (‘Chakrabarty’), which in a single act of judicial 
legislation expanded the system of utility patents to include living inventions.18 
The broad premise of the decision in Chakrabarty — that ‘anything under the 
sun that is [novel and] made by man’19 is patentable — implied that there was no 
longer any justification for excluding plants from the general patent system and 
sequestering them in the regime of patent rights or plant variety rights.20 In 
response, the US Patent Office almost immediately started to grant utility patents 
in respect of plants, and it seemed that all prior objections to the patenting of 
plants and living organisms were either merely procedural or premised on an 
outdated technological vision: ‘The questions that had been raised for decades 
over protection of plants were suddenly irrelevant for perhaps all living things.’21 
In the US, the decision in Chakrabarty effectively curtailed fundamental 
doctrinal questions about the patentability of biological and biotechnological 
inventions. The formal legal question in the case22 was whether a genetically 
engineered bacterium could qualify as a ‘manufacture’ or a ‘composition of 
matter’ within the terms of the US Patent Act of 1952.23 Referring to the text of 
the Patent Act, which prescribes that patents might be issued for ‘any new and 
 
 17 Cary Fowler, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution (1994) 93. 
 18 447 US 303, 318 (Burger CJ for the Court) (1980). 
 19 Ibid 309 (Burger CJ for the Court). 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 Fowler, above n 17, 150. 
 22 Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 307 (Burger CJ for the Court) (1980). 
 23 Pub L No 593, 66 Stat 792. For the current version: see 35 USC § 100–376 (2000 & Supp IV, 
2005). See especially 35 USC § 101 (2000 & Supp IV, 2005). 
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useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’,24 a majority in 
the US Supreme Court held that the meaning of the four subject matter limita-
tions was governed by the prefatory term ‘any’: ‘In choosing such expansive 
terms as “manufacture” and “composition of matter”, modified by the compre-
hensive “any”, Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be 
given wide scope’.25 If inventions were, by definition, new and non-obvious, 
then patent statutes should be ready for the unknowable, and should employ the 
most expansive language: ‘Congress employed broad general language in 
drafting § 101 precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable’.26 The 
effect was to direct attention away from the definition of manufactures — the 
question of what mode of action or origination was implied in the terms ‘compo-
sition’ and ‘manufacture’ — and towards the question of novelty. The US 
Supreme Court affirmed the novelty of an invention, rather than its mode of 
origination or reproduction, as the essential qualification for patentability. A 
‘new’ organism was every bit as ‘novel’ as a ‘new’ machine. 
The approach taken in Chakrabarty was affirmed in relation to plant inven-
tions by J E M Ag Supply v Pioneer Hi-Bred (‘Pioneer Hi-Bred’),27 in which a 
majority of the US Supreme Court held that plant inventions were eligible for 
utility patent protection. Significantly, the counter-argument before the US 
Supreme Court was not that plants were not manufactures or compositions of 
matter, but rather that the passing of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant 
Variety Protection Act of 197028 expressed a congressional intent to exclude 
plants from the scheme of utility patents. There is a sense in which an investiga-
tion of the meaning of ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ was barred by 
stare decisis,29 but the conceptual and doctrinal force of the decision was an 
effect of something more than formal principles of interpretation. By holding 
that living organisms were eligible for patent protection, the decision in Chakra-
barty gave rise to the idea that there was no categorical difference between 
organisms and manufactures, and hence no need to define the limits of ‘manu-
facture’. 
This is not necessarily true of jurisdictions outside the US. For example, the 
question addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Harvard Col-
lege v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)30 was almost exactly the same as that 
addressed by the US Supreme Court in Chakrabarty: namely, was a geneti-
cally-engineered organism — in this case, a mouse — a ‘manufacture’ or a 
‘composition of matter’ for the purposes of the Canadian Patent Act?31 Unlike its 
 
 24 35 USC § 101 (2000 & Supp IV, 2005). 
 25 Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308 (Burger CJ for the Court) (1980). 
 26 Ibid 316 (Burger CJ for the Court). 
 27 534 US 124 (2001). 
 28 Pub L No 91–577, 84 Stat 1542. For the current version: see 7 USC §§ 2321–583 (2000 & 
Supp V, 2006). 
 29 Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 US 124, 147 (Scalia J) (2001): ‘Stare decisis … prevents us from any 
longer regarding as an open question — as ambiguous — whether “composition of matter” 
includes living things. Diamond v Chakrabarty … holds that it does.’ 
 30 [2002] 4 SCR 45, 83 (Binnie J for McLachlin CJC, Major and Arbour JJ). 
 31 RSC 1985, c P-4. 
     
2007] Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant Inventions 545 
     
US counterpart, the Canadian Supreme Court held that although the inventor had 
invented and ‘manufactured’ the gene construct that was inserted into each 
mouse embryo, the ultimate products (adult mice bearing the trait conferred by 
the construct) were grown through natural metabolic and ontogenetic proc-
esses.32 This meant that the mouse as a whole could not be a ‘manufacture’ 
because its material form was not entirely structured or programmed by the 
patented ‘idea’.33 The response of one commentator in the US to this anxiety 
about the definition of a ‘composition of matter’ — ‘one is left to wonder what 
else the mouse could possibly have been composed from’34 — reveals the extent 
to which the Chakrabarty and Pioneer Hi-Bred decisions have narrowed the 
focus of legal doctrine. If in broader social and economic terms the effect of the 
decision in Chakrabarty was ‘to normalize genetic engineering by providing 
forms and methods of discourse that made the applications of the technique seem 
amenable to control’,35 then in doctrinal terms the effect has been to cast the 
subject-matter limitations of the patent statute as codifications of policy choices, 
rather than expressions of a fundamental (if indeterminate) paradigm of inven-
tion. 
The basic premise of the post-Chakrabarty approach to biological or biotech-
nological inventions is that biotechnology is the latest variation on the theme of 
instrumental, or instrumentalising, technology — just as the mechanical and 
chemical sciences instrumentalised inanimate nature, so biotechnology instru-
mentalises animate nature, and turns organisms into manufactures.36 
Recent developments in fields such as synthetic biology37 seem to confirm this 
analogy between biotechnological and mechanical knowledge; the image of 
synthetic biology as an exercise in ‘engineering’ building blocks and program-
mable logic gates synthesised from animate materials, extends the mechanical 
and instrumental vision of nature into the deep texture of life. However, doctrinal 
interpretations premised on this notion of instrumentality are partial in two ways. 
First, they only isolate one speculative strand of contemporary biotechnology, 
for example in biomedicine, instrumental approaches give no purchase on the 
complex, emergent dynamics of cellular metabolism.38 Secondly, the presenta-
tion of biotechnology as a mode of mechanisation affirms and continues a trend 
in legal scholarship since Chakrabarty, which sees the question of biotechnology 
patents in normative rather than conceptual terms. Such an approach leaves little 
room for the study of the Plant Patent Act of 1930. 
 
 32 Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002] 4 SCR 45, 127 (Bastarache J for 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache and LeBel JJ). 
 33 See ibid 130 (Bastarache J for L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache and LeBel JJ). 
 34 Dan L Burk, ‘The Problem of Process in Biotechnology’ (2006) 43 Houston Law Review 561, 
564. 
 35 Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (1995) 140. 
 36 See Alain Pottage and Brad Sherman, ‘Kinds, Clones, and Manufactures’ in Mario Biagioli, 
Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee (eds), Contexts of Invention (2008, forthcoming). 
 37 See generally, Paras Chopra and Akhil Kamma, ‘Engineering Life through Synthetic Biology’ 
(2006) 6 In Silico Biology 401; ETC Group, Extreme Genetic Engineering: An Introduction to 
Synthetic Biology (2006). 
 38 See The ENCODE Project Consortium, ‘Identification and Analysis of Functional Elements in 
1% of the Human Genome by the ENCODE Pilot Project’ (2007) 447 Nature 799. 
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On the other hand, from the perspective of what might be called the ‘concep-
tual fabrication’ of patent rights,39 a study of the Act is timely because it reveals a 
set of conceptual tensions that are still in play today, which centre on the 
distinctions between mechanisms and organisms, industrial manufacturing and 
biological reproduction, and texts and material objects. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that the passing of the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 was driven by fundamental doctrinal arguments about the nature of 
invention. Instead, the legislation was effectively carried by a set of pragmatic 
arguments. In their efforts to eradicate the ‘pirating’ of new plant varieties,40 
having failed to obtain amendments to trade mark law that would have penalised 
the misuse of plant names,41 the nursery industry proposed that the patent system 
should be extended to new plant varieties. The arguments made in support of this 
proposal were of a familiar kind. Not only would the new law alleviate the 
impoverished condition of plant breeders,42 it would also stimulate private 
investment in breeding.43 Anticipating arguments that were made in the latter 
part of the 20th century in respect of agricultural biotechnology, it was said that 
this legislative incentive would encourage the development of new and improved 
varieties, particularly those that were resistant to drought and cold.44 And for 
those who remained unconvinced, it was suggested that by promoting investment 
in breeding, plant patents would not only lift the gloom that weighed on US 
agriculture45 but also maintain public health, promote public safety and even 
enhance national defence.46 Faced with a diminishing agricultural population, the 
beginning of the economic downturn that would become the Great Depression, 
concerns about the food supply, and the fact that the proposal aimed to ‘do 
something for agriculture’, it is not surprising that the plan to introduce plant 
patents met with little opposition.47 
 
 39 See generally Marilyn Strathern, ‘Losing (Out on) Intellectual Resources’ in Alain Pottage and 
Martha Mundy (eds), Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons 
and Things (2004) 201.  
 40 Agitation for plant patents was said to have begun in 1868: ‘200 New Plants Patented Since 1930’ 
(January 1937) Scientific American 58, 59; Harry Goldsmith, ‘Patents for Plant Inventors’ 
(1937) 29 Nature Magazine 150; ‘Patents of Plants’ (1936) 84(2184) Science — Supplement 7, 8. 
 41 A series of failed Bills was introduced in 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1910. For an overview: see Mark D 
Janis and Jay P Kesan, ‘US Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury …?’ (2002) 39 Houston 
Law Review 727, 731–5. 
 42 ‘Patenting of Plants Promises Big Profits — and Big Problems’, Business Week (New York), 26 
August 1931, 26: ‘Few plant breeders drive Hispana-Suizas [a luxury car of the 1930s]’. 
 43 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, Report on Plant Patents, HR Rep No 71-1129, 
1–2 (1930); Senate Committee on Patents, Report on Plant Patents, S Rep No 71-315, 1–2 
(1930). The reports of the congressional Committees on Patents are reproduced in ‘The Plant 
Patent Law’ (1930) 21 Journal of Heredity 319, 319–22, 357–61. 
 44 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 3; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 2. 
 45 It was suggested that the only way in which the depressed nature of agriculture in the US, which only 
held its own by virtue of US subsidies, could be remedied was by way of ‘an incentive system like 
the patent system’: John A Dienner, ‘Patents for Biological Specimens and Products’ (1953) 35 
Journal of the Patent Office Society 286, 292. 
 46 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 3; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 3. 
 47 While the primary aim of the new law was to promote private investment in breeding, it was 
suggested by some that the new regime would undermine public breeding programmes, particularly 
the US government’s free seed programme, which was administered by the US Patent Office (and 
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While there were still doubts about some aspects of the plant patents scheme, 
the proponents of the new law had garnered enough support from organisations 
such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Department of Agriculture, 
and from orchardists, farmers and horticulturists48 to have identical Bills 
introduced into the US Senate and House of Representatives in February 1930.49 
After a brief discussion, the Bills were sent to the congressional Committees on 
Patents to be reviewed. In light of the Committees’ recommendations,50 revised 
Bills were introduced into Congress in April of 1930. After a brief debate, the 
Plant Patent Act of 193051 was passed by Congress on 13 May 1930, and signed 
by President Hoover52 on 23 May 1930. 
Based upon a practice developed in relation to design patents, applications for 
plant patents under the Act had to contain a single claim, which was meant to set 
out the distinguishing characteristics of the plant.53 While the form of the claim 
varied, they tended to follow a similar pattern in which, after linking the claim to 
‘the plant as described’, applicants would highlight the distinct features of the 
invention. For example, Plant Patent 1 claimed ‘[a] climbing rose as herein 
shown and described, characterised by its everblooming habit’,54 while Plant 
Patent 28 claimed ‘[t]he rose as shown and described, characterized by the 
golden yellow color of its petals, the form and size of its bloom, its stiff long 
stem, the intense fragrance, and its remontant and everblooming habit.’55 With 
reference to disclosure, each claim was meant to ‘describe in detail the new plant 
and furnish all the information possible as to how it was created so that it can be 
 
was said to have hindered the development of the private sector seed industry in the US): see Cary 
Fowler, ‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation’ (2000) 82 Journal 
of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 621, 636–7. There is a discussion of the campaign 
by the American Seed Trade Association against the US government’s free seed programme: at 
627–8. 
 48 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 4; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 3. See also Congressional Record, 8750 (12 May 1930) (statement of Mr Town-
send). 
 49 A Bill to Provide for Plant Patents, HR 11 372, 71st Congress (1930); A Bill to Provide for Plant 
Patents, S 4015, 71st Congress (1930). 
 50 The House Committee on Patents made two amendments. One added a separability clause that 
protected utility patents if plant patents were declared unconstitutional, the other eliminated 
from the scope of the Bill patents for plant varieties which were introduced to the public prior to 
the approval of the Act: House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 1. The 
Senate Committee on Patents also added a separability clause and eliminated patents for varie-
ties of plants which exist in an uncultivated or wild state, but are newly found by plant explorers 
or others: Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 1. 
 51 Pub L No 245, 46 Stat 376. For the current version: see 35 USC §§ 161–4 (2000 & Supp IV, 2005).  
 52 President Herbert Hoover had previous intellectual property experience. During his time as the Head 
of the US Department of Commerce, he had ultimate control of the US Patent Office and the US 
Commissioner of Patents reported to him. Hoover also led the US delegation to the October 1925 
Hague Conference for the Protection of Industrial Property. See T H A, ‘Herbert Hoover and the 
Patent Office’ (June 1925) Scientific American 373, 373. 
 53 Clinton H Neagley, Donald D Jeffrey and Anthony B Diepenbrock, ‘Section 101 Plant Patents 
— Panacea or Pitfall?’ (1983) 1(2) American Patent Law Association: Selected Legal Papers 
A-1, A-10: ‘each plant patent has a single claim directed to the disclosed plant. One cannot claim 
a genus or group of plants or any part of a plant. Thus, generic protection … is unavailable.’  
 54 US Plant Patent No 1 (filed 6 August 1930) (granted 18 August 1931). 
 55 US Plant Patent No 28 (filed 19 January 1932) (granted 4 October 1932). 
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definitely identified and if possible reproduced by others independently.’56 
Where colour was claimed, it was necessary for the drawings to be as accurate 
and permanent as possible according to a recognised standard such as Ridgway’s 
Color Chart, A Maerz and M Rea Paul’s A Dictionary of Color,57 or Specimen 
Tints of Winsor and Newton’s Artists’ Oil and Water Colours.58 Specifications 
also contained a historical account of the development of the new plant. This 
included information such as how the plant was bred, where the sports, buds or 
mutations had been found, how that plant differed from similar plants, when the 
plant bloomed, and the soils and climates that best suited it. While there was 
some uncertainty as to whether the US Patent Office allowed commercial names 
to be used in an application,59 a study in 1944 showed that the majority of the 
patented plants contained the names given to them by their originators: a practice 
which has continued since.60 Although the names were arbitrary, they were not 
regarded as trade marks.61 Instead, they were used descriptively to identify 
particular plants.62 Applicants also had to include an oath stating that: (1) they 
believed that the ‘variety of plant had not been introduced to the public prior to 
the passage of the Act of May 23, 1930’; and (2) they had asexually reproduced 
the distinct and new variety of plant described in the annexed specification.63 
The grant of a plant patent was conditional on the satisfaction of a number of 
criteria.64 The main requirement was that the application should be for a ‘plant 
variety’.65 While there was some confusion as to the meaning of the term 
‘variety’,66 it was accepted that new and distinct varieties were divided into three 
classes: sports, mutants and hybrids. Protection did not extend, however, to 
 
 56 Robert Starr Allyn, The First Plant Patents: A Discussion on the New Law and Patent Office 
Practice (1934) 18. See also Patents, Trademarks and Copyright Rules, 37 CFR 1 §§ 1.163–4 
(2007). 
 57 A Maerz and M Rea Paul, A Dictionary of Color (2nd ed, 1950). 
 58 Raymond A Magnuson, ‘A Short Discussion on Various Aspects of Plant Patents’ (1948) 30 
Journal of the Patent Office Society 493, 504. The colour charts, such as Ridgway’s Color Chart, 
were ‘commercially manufactured set[s] of cards, much like paint-sample cards, that breeders 
held against a plant to identify and match a name to its colors’: Daniel J Kevles, A History of 
Patenting Life in the United States with Comparative Attention to Europe and Canada (A Report 
to the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 12 January 2002) 11. 
 59 Joseph Rossman, ‘The Preparation and Prosecution of Plant Patent Applications’ (1935) 17 
Journal of the Patent Office Society 632, 639: ‘The Patent Office does not object to the use of 
commercial names of varieties in the specification but the proposed commercial varietal name of 
the new plant is at present considered objectionable.’ 
 60 Robert Starr Allyn, Plant Patents 1934 to 1943: A Supplement to The First Plant Patents (Nos 1 
to 84) (1944) 40. 
 61 Magnuson, above n 58, 501. 
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Rossman, ‘The Preparation and Prosecution of Plant Patent Applications’, above n 59, 635. 
 64 General patent law was applicable to plant patents, except as otherwise provided — the notable 
exception being in relation to the description requirement in 35 USC § 112 and the number of 
claims. For plant patents, distinctness replaces utility and the additional requirement of asexual 
reproduction is introduced: Yoder Brothers Inc v California-Florida Plant Corporation, 537 F 
2d 1347, 1377–8 (Goldberg J) (5th Cir, 1976) (‘Yoder Brothers’). 
 65 Allyn, The First Plant Patents, above n 56, 28. 
 66 ‘Variety’ was used interchangeably with ‘species’ in the congressional Patent Committee 
Reports. Robert Starr Allyn suggested that there was nothing in the committee reports to suggest 
that ‘variety’ was restricted to a technical meaning and that the history of the Act indicated that 
the word was used in a broad sense to cover kinds, types and species: ibid 29.  
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tuber-propagated plants such as Irish potatoes and Jerusalem artichokes,67 
primarily because they are propagated by the same part of the plant that is used 
as food.68 Another possible reason for this exclusion was that the Department of 
Agriculture wished to keep its own potato-breeding project outside the terms of 
the Act.69 Paul Stark later said that a reason for the exclusion was that because 
potatoes were readily available and used both as a food source and for the 
growing of plants, infringement of a potato plant patent would have been ‘easy’ 
and ‘widespread’, thereby making enforcement absurd.70 To qualify for patent 
protection, the applicant had to show that they had invented, or discovered and 
then asexually reproduced, the plant in question.71 Applicants also had to show 
that the plant was ‘novel’ and ‘distinct’. A plant was novel if it had not been sold 
or released in the US more than one year prior to the date of the application, or if 
the plant had not been enabled to the public (by description in a printed publica-
tion in the US more than one year before the patent application, or by release or 
sale of the plant more than one year prior to the patent application). A plant was 
distinct if it had characteristics that were clearly distinguishable from existing 
varieties.72 A range of factors was used to distinguish a new plant variety, 
including: habit; immunity from disease; the colour of the flowers, leaves, fruit 
or stems; flavour; productivity; perfume; form; ease of asexual reproduction; and 
resistance to heat, cold or wind.73 Reflecting the agnosticism that pervades 
intellectual property law, it was immaterial whether the new characteristics were 
inferior or superior to existing varieties or indeed, whether an entirely new 
species of plant had been created.74 What mattered was simply that the new plant 
differed in some respect from existing plants.75 
 
 67 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 6; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 5. ‘Tuber’ was defined as a short, thickened portion of an underground branch (and 
does not cover bulbs, corms, stolons and rhizomes). A Jerusalem artichoke is a flowering plant 
native to North America that is used both as a vegetable and as livestock feed: Senate Committee on 
Patents, above n 43, 5. 
 68 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 6; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 5; Magnuson, above n 58, 467. 
 69 Neagley, Jeffrey and Diepenbrock, above n 53, A-3.  
 70 Patent Law Revision Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Congress, pt 2, 865 (1968) (report of Paul Stark).  
 71 Bourne v Jones, 114 F Supp 413, 413 (Whitehurst J) (SD Fla, 1951); affd 207 F 2d 173 (5th Cir, 
1953); cert denied 346 US 897 (1953). 
 72 Known plants were used as the basis of comparison: see House of Representatives Committee on 
Patents, above n 43, 5; Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 4–5. 
 73 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 5; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 4:  
Within any one of the above or other classes of characteristics the differences which would 
suffice to make the variety a distinct variety, will necessarily be differences of degree. While 
the degree of difference sufficient for patentability will undoubtedly be a difficult administra-
tive question in some instances, the situation does not present greater difficulties than many 
that arise in the case of industrial patents. 
 74 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 5; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 4. 
 75 Leonard Barron, ‘Come into the Garden’ (1930) 58 Country Life 127, 127: ‘A new plant may be 
inferior to extant forms; but for the purposes of patenting, it is enough that it is different in such a 
way that its difference may be described by contrast to other recognised varieties or forms.’  
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Working closely with the Bureau of Plant Industry in the US Department of 
Agriculture, the application was examined to ensure that it complied with the 
relevant requirements for patentability. Once the US Patent Office was satisfied 
that an application was patentable, protection was granted for a term of 17 
years.76 Despite occasional attempts to broaden the scope of the right, protection 
was limited to unauthorised asexual reproductions (or vegetative propagations) 
of the patented plant.77 This meant that plant patent protection was limited to 
identical reproductions or clonal copies of the patented plant. Over time, the 
requirement of asexual reproduction was interpreted to mean that infringement 
was dependent upon a plaintiff bringing evidence that the defendant’s plant was 
derived from the patented plant.78 For there to be an infringement, it was 
necessary to show that there had been a physical appropriation from the patented 
plant. This meant that a person could develop a similar, or even an identical, 
plant and not only be free from a charge of infringement but also be entitled to a 
patent of their own.79 Based upon the idea that the public should be the ultimate 
judge of the value of the plant, the granting of a plant patent only secured a 
proprietary interest; it was not intended to stand as a cachet or seal of the quality 
of the plant. In this sense, the plant patent system differed from the registration 
schemes that were employed by some floral societies and advocated by bodies 
such as the Horticultural Council of Canada, which only registered plants that 
were considered to be improvements over existing forms or varieties.80 
The basic features of this brief legislative history — the exaltation of the 
genius of the breeder as inventor, the claim to authorship and the evolution of the 
patentability criteria for new varieties — are not especially surprising. Neverthe-
less, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 is still important, not least because the Act’s 
pragmatic premises were complemented and reinforced by a number of funda-
mental reflections on both the basic logic of patent law and the differences 
between natural and human ingenuity. This process of reflection and negotiation 
continued for some decades in a posteriori interpretations of the Act. 
 
 76 Magnuson, above n 58, 507. 
 77 See Imazio Nursery Inc v Dania Greenhouses, 69 F 3d 1560, 1570 (Rich J) (Fed Cir, 1995). 
 78 See, eg, Yoder Brothers, 537 F 2d 1347, 1380 (Goldberg J) (5th Cir, 1976); cert denied 429 US 
1094 (1977); Kim Bros v Hagler, 167 F Supp 665 (SD Cal, 1958); affd 276 F 2d 259 (9th Cir, 
1960); Cole Nursery Co v Youdath Perennial Gardens Inc, 17 F Supp 159 (ND Ohio, 1936) 
(‘Cole Nursery’). 
 79 Peter Forbes Langrock, ‘Plant Patents: Biological Necessities in Infringement Suits’ (1959) 41 
Journal of the Patent Office Society 787, 788–9. Langrock added the rider that it was ‘theoreti-
cally possible for two plants to have identical genetic structures and yet come from different 
sources. Such a possibility however is almost as remote as two human beings, not twins, having 
identical genetic structures’: at 789. 
 80 Barron, above n 75. Despite this, plant patents were presented as an assurance of quality, akin to 
a trade mark such as the ‘All-American Selection’ (registered as a certification mark on 23 
October 1951), which was only applied to seeds that ‘proved to be superior’ in test trials. See 
also Fleeta Brownell Woodroffe, ‘A Guarantee to Gardeners’ (July 1945) Better Homes and 
Gardens 71: ‘altho [sic] the cost of patented plants is usually somewhat higher, the extra you pay 
over the cost of unpatented items gets you rarity, beauty, and assured quality of stock.’ 
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III   PRODUCTS OF  NATURE 
Prior to 1930, it was commonly believed that irrespective of the degree of 
human intervention in their production, plants were products of nature and 
therefore not subject to patent protection.81 The US Supreme Court observed in 
Chakrabarty that the notion that plants were outside the remit of patent law seems 
to have arisen from the 1889 case of Ex parte Latimer in which the tribunal rejected 
an application for a patent relating to fibre that William Latimer had found in the 
needle of Pinus australis.82 In confirming the examiner’s decision to reject the 
application, the US Commissioner of Patents held that the fibre that Latimer had 
discovered was simply a ‘natural product’ and, as such, could ‘no more be the 
subject of a patent in its natural state when freed from its surroundings than 
wheat which has been cut by a reaper or by some new method if reaping can be 
patented as wheat cut by such a process.’83 
The decision to exclude the application was made on the basis that if the claim 
had been allowed, the patent would have extended to ‘trees of the forest and the 
plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and impossible.’84 
Reiterating the distinction between the natural (discovery) and the artificial 
(invention) that underpins the ‘product of nature’ doctrine, the US Commissioner of 
Patents went on to say that while natural products such as plants were not subject to 
patent protection, if the products of nature had been acted upon so as to change their 
character, the product in its changed form would fall into the class of patentable 
subject matter.85 Accordingly, 
[i]f the applicant’s process had another final step by which the fibre thus with-
drawn or separated from the leaf or needle in its natural state were changed, ei-
ther by curling it or giving it some new quality or function which it does not 
possess in its natural condition as fibre, the … fibre … would … become 
something new or different from what it is in its natural state.86 
When the idea of amending patent law to accommodate plant patents was mooted 
at the beginning of the 20th century, one of the initial responses was that the scheme 
was not feasible because plants fell foul of the product of nature doctrine. In the 
discussions that preceded the passing of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the argument 
that plants were unpatentable products of nature was dismissed out of hand by 
 
 81 By the 1930s, the unpatentability of products of nature was regarded as a dogma which was 
‘axiomatic’: K P McElroy, ‘Elements in Patent Law’ (1929) 21 Industrial and Engineering 
Chemistry 608, 608. According to McElroy, the phrase ‘product of nature’ was not the result of the 
US Commissioner of Patent’s decision in Ex parte Latimer, Dec Comm’r Pat 123 (1889). Rather it 
came from ‘some law clerk with the soul of a sloganeer … [l]ikely he evolved it from his inner 
consciousness, as the Dutchman did his description of a giraffe’: at 608.  
 82 Dec Comm’r Pat 123, 123 (Commissioner Hall) (1889): patent application was for a method of 
extracting that fibre from the 20-inch needle of Australian pine. As the US Supreme Court noted 
in Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 313 (Burger CJ for the Court) (1980): ‘Congress … recognized that 
the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, 
whether living or not, and human-made inventions.’ 
 83 Ex parte Latimer, Dec Comm’r Pat 123, 127 (Commissioner Hall) (1889). See also Harold C 
Thorne, ‘Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products’ (1923) 6 Journal of the Patent Office 
Society 23, 24; Robert Cook, Florists Exchange and Horticultural Trade World (15 July 1933) 9.  
 84 Ex parte Latimer, Dec Comm’r Pat 123, 126 (Commissioner Hall) (1889). 
 85 Ibid. 
 86 Ibid 127 (Commissioner Hall).  
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proponents of the legislation.87 For example, Albert Walker, author of a leading 19th 
century treatise on patent law, appeared before the US House Committee on Patents 
in support of the 1906 Bill to Amend the Laws of the United States Relating to 
Patents in the Interest of the Originators of Horticultural Products88 (which shared 
many features of the Plant Patent Act of 1930). Walker dismissed the objection that 
plants were not patentable because they were natural products by arguing that there 
was a clear distinction between ineligible discoveries (such as the discovery of the 
anaesthetic qualities of sulphuric ether) and eligible inventions (such as a plant 
‘created by’ a breeder).89 Indeed, apart from observations of the US Secretary of 
Agriculture at the time, who suggested that ‘patent protection was limited to 
inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature’,90 participants in the 
debate about the desirability of plant patents were more likely to frame their 
arguments in terms of some version of the products of nature doctrine than in terms 
of an absolute division between animate and inanimate objects.91 
While arguments of this nature may have been sufficient to alleviate any doubts 
that the US Congress had about the legitimacy of plant patents, the possibility that 
plants were products of nature and, as such, were not patentable, resurfaced once the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 was passed. It was not clear precisely how products of 
nature were to be distinguished from products of human ingenuity — what mode 
of origination, intervention or control characterised human inventions? More 
precisely, how exactly did breeders have to modify or inflect natural processes in 
order to qualify as inventors? In part, these concerns were fuelled by the US 
Supreme Court decision of American Fruit Growers Inc v Brogdex Co,92 which 
reversed the finding of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and held that 
an orange dipped in a solution of borax to render the skin mould-resistant was not a 
manufactured article and thus was not patentable. This decision, which was handed 
down the year after the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was passed, reinforced the growing 
concern about ‘[w]hether varieties derived through the exercise of the plant 
breeders’ art will not also be considered products of nature in the same sense as are 
products of ductile tungsten, a substance not known to occur naturally’.93 The US 
Supreme Court defined the term ‘manufacture’ by drawing on a dictionary — ‘the 
production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these 
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by handla[bor] 
or by machinery’.94 The Court went on to observe that there was ‘no change in the 
name, appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit 
 
 87 Robert C Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’ (1931) 22 Journal of Heredity 313, 317–18; Robert 
Cook, ‘Patents for New Plants’ (1932) 27 American Mercury 66, 68. 
 88 HR 18 851, 59th Congress (1906). 
 89 Arguments Before the Committee on Patents, House of Representatives, 50th Congress, United 
States of America, HR 18851, Washington, 17 May 1906, 15–16. See also Janis and Kesan, 
above n 41, 734. 
 90 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 10; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 9. Cf Charkrabarty, 447 US 303, 312–13 (Burger CJ for the Court) (1980). 
 91 McElroy, ‘Elements in Patent Law’, above n 81, 608. 
 92 283 US 1 (1931).  
 93 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 317–18. 
 94 American Fruit Growers Inc v Brogdex Co, 283 US 1, 11 (McReynolds J for the Court) (1931). 
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only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.’95 The decision prompted some 
commentators to reconsider the precise nature of plant patents; in particular, it led 
some to ask what was characterised as one of the most important and crucial 
questions in determining the scope of plant patent law — namely, what does it mean 
to invent a plant?96 
Proponents of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 had consistently argued that artificial 
selection was a mode of invention. For example, in his observations to the congres-
sional committee formed in February 1930 to examine the Plant Patent Bill, Thomas 
Edison observed that 
[n]othing that Congress could do to help farming would be of greater value and 
permanence than to give the plant breeder the same status as the mechanical or 
chemical inventors now have through patent law. There are but a few plant 
breeders. This … will, I feel sure, give us many [Luther] Burbanks.97 
In this vein, and invoking the notion of origination, proponents of plant patents 
emphasised the time, skill and ingenuity that was needed to develop a better 
flavoured fruit, or a new flower with a pleasing perfume or graceful petals. For 
example, by highlighting the fact that over 65 000 hybrid bushes had been grown 
and eliminated in the development of the white blackberry, or that Luther Burbank 
had selected his famous seedless plum from 300 000 artificially produced varia-
tions,98 supporters were able to show that the development of a new plant required a 
considerable amount of experimentation and breeding.99 These arguments were 
strengthened by technological developments, notably those based on the rediscov-
ery of Gregor Mendel’s laws of heredity in 1900.100 Burbank summed up the 
changes when he said that ‘plant breeding has developed into a practice, and as we 
learn more about the underlying principles of the art, we realize that it is beginning 
to be fixed as a science.’101 Anticipating the approach taken by the US Supreme 
Court in Chakrabarty, organisations such as the American Breeder’s Association — 
which was concerned with developing Mendelian genetics, plant breeding and 
 
 95 Ibid 12 (McReynolds J for the Court). See also In re Ewald, 129 F 2d 340, 342 (CCPA, 1942): a 
cored pear was held not to be a manufacture because it did not possess a new name, character or 
use; Donald Strickland, ‘Recent Decisions’ (1978) 47 George Washington Law Review 242, 
245–6. 
 96 Robert C Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent Decision’ (1937) 19 Journal of the Patent Office Society 
187, 190. 
 97 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 3; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 3. Luther Burbank (1849–1926) was a successful and well-known breeder who devel-
oped more than 800 new varieties of plant over his 50-year career: see Peter Dreyer, A Gardener 
Touched with Genius: The Life of Luther Burbank (revised ed, 1985) xi. 
 98 Joseph Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’ (1931) 13 Journal of the Patent Office Society 7, 10: ‘It took 
Burbank 19 years to perfect the amaryllis and over 20 years to … [produce] a new hybrid lily.’ 
 99 R Francé, ‘Experimenting with Animals and Plants: Studies in Artificial Mutation’ (1909) 67 
Scientific American Supplement No 1735 216, 216–17. 
100 Cary Fowler, ‘Protecting Farmer Innovation: The Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Question of Origin’ (2001) 41 Jurimetrics Journal 477, 479. See also House of Representatives 
Committee on Patents, above n 43, 1; Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 1. 
101 Luther Burbank, ‘Prodigal Mother Nature: By Cross-Breeding and Persistent Selection the Plant 
Breeder Speeds Up Nature’s Slow, Wasteful Hit-or-Miss Methods of Producing New Species a 
Thousand-Fold’ (1926) 134 Scientific American 365, 365–6. See also Henry D Hooker, ‘Horti-
culture as a Science’ (14 April 1922) 55 Science, New Series 384, 384–5; Randall R Howard, ‘An 
Inventor of Roses’ (1916) 25 Illustrated World 481. 
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eugenics102 — argued that if the law was not to be outpaced by science, patent law 
needed to be changed to accommodate recent technological and scientific develop-
ments.103 
Ironically, however, most of the botanical innovations that the nursery industry 
was so keen to protect were the product of traditional, rather than scientific, 
breeding practices. Although there had been a dramatic change in the science of 
breeding in the early part of the 20th century, the application of the new biology 
largely occurred outside the nursery sector. Most of the selective back-breeding 
used to introduce targeted traits into host varieties took place in sexually-reproduced 
crops such as maize.104 In the 1920s and 1930s, there was little scientific breeding 
in the nursery industries. Instead, breeders relied on more traditional breeding 
techniques. In some cases, breeders would produce a large number of artificial 
hybrids, from which they would select ‘a few desirable forms and destroy … great 
numbers of worthless individuals’.105 In the bulk of cases, however, the industry 
relied on nature’s own ‘breeding experiments’ to provide new plants — namely the 
seedlings, bud mutations and sports that were discovered growing on trees and 
plants.106 A sport or bud variation occurs where a plant or a portion of a plant 
spontaneously assumes an appearance or character distinct from that which 
normally characterises the variety or species.107 A mutant is a new and distinct 
variety that results from seedling variations generated by the self-pollination of a 
species.108 Although by the 1930s, breeders had begun to subject plants to X-rays 
and abnormally high levels of fertilisation in an attempt to encourage the develop-
ment of bud mutations and sports,109 in most cases they relied on orchardists, 
farmers, landscapers and others to discover these aberrant creations.110 
With these practices in mind, a number of articles published in the decade follow-
ing the passage of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 returned to the question of whether 
artificial selection was indeed a mode of invention. Many of the authors of these 
articles, who were mainly professional breeders (protecting their new-found status 
as inventors) and patent attorneys (protecting traditional patent doctrine), com-
plained about the number of plant patents granted to individuals who had merely 
discovered and then asexually reproduced a new sport or mutation. The objection 
 
102 Fowler, ‘A Sociological History’, above n 47, 631. 
103 Ibid 634–5. 
104 For a general history: see Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr, First the Seed: The Political Economy of 
Plant Biotechnology (2nd ed, 2004). 
105 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 319. 
106 D F Jones, ‘Hybridization in Plant and Animal Improvement’ (1922) 14 Scientific Monthly 5,  
6–7. 
107 Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 13. 
108 A bud mutation was defined as ‘[a] mutation affecting a bud, so that it gives rise to a branch 
(flower, etc) differing in one or more characteristics from the rest of the plant’: ‘A Glossary of 
Genetic Terms’ (1937) 28 Journal of Heredity 71, 72. 
109 See L J Stadler, ‘Some Genetic Effects of X-Rays in Plants’ (1930) 21 Journal of Heredity 3, 3 
(the experiments reported in this article were partly sponsored by a grant from the National 
Research Council’s Committee on Effects of Radiation on Living Organisms); Raymond Pond, 
‘Effects of the Rays of Radium on Plants’ (1909) 30 Science 810, 810; C Stuart Gager, ‘Radium 
Rays and Plant Life Processes: Some Interesting Discoveries’ (1909) 67 Scientific American 
Supplement No 1738 264, 264. 
110 Fowler, ‘A Sociological History’, above n 47, 643. 
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was that the breeder had ‘not produced something new from the sport, but ha[d] 
duplicated nature’s sport and claim[ed] that sport.’111 The problem with giving 
protection to sports, buds and mutations was, precisely, that it did not accord 
with the doctrinal paradigm of invention as origination. As Robert Starr Allyn, a 
New York patent attorney, wrote: 
I see [no] sense in granting a patent to a [person] who claims to be a profes-
sional plant breeder and refusing a patent to an amateur plant lover who per-
forms the same act, ie seeing and reproducing something which nature has pro-
duced without any thought on the part of the discoverer.112 
As well as highlighting the constitutional problem in extending patent protection to 
mere discoveries,113 commentators argued that 
[t]he granting of a patent to the discoverer of a form when he has taken no part 
in its production (bud mutation) is considered by some competent authorities to 
be distinctly contrary to the intent of the [Plant Patent Act of 1930] because of 
the absence of any inventive faculty in merely finding a fortuitous mutation.114 
These concerns seemed to materialise when the ‘inventor’ of the first plant to be 
patented, Henry Bosenberg, a landscape gardener from New Jersey, admitted under 
oath that he had done nothing to develop the new form of climbing rose known as 
the ‘New Dawn’. Instead, the new plant was an aberrant, repeat-flowering version 
of an established variety of climbing rose known as the Dr Van Fleet, which 
Bosenberg had bought for use in his landscape work. Bosenberg’s contribution was 
limited to recognising and asexually reproducing the ‘new’ rose.115 Commentators 
also drew attention to the fact that a person who merely propagated or asexually 
reproduced a plant that had been discovered by another could claim to be the 
inventor of the resulting plant.116 This problem was highlighted by Plant Patent 11, 
in which two people were listed as joint inventors of a new variety of hybrid tea 
rose called the Ambassador.117 According to the patent, the first inventor discovered 
the plant as a sport in 1929, while the second inventor fostered and developed the 
plant, studied it and asexually reproduced it by budding. The problem with this was 
that the routine propagation of a plant was seen to be even less inventive than the 
chance discovery of a bud or sport.118 
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Most of the participants in the post-1930 debate were willing to accept that where 
a breeder had spent ‘years of purposeful endeavour to produce the final form’119 — 
as was the case where a new variety was selected from a large number of hybrid 
plants grown out over a series of generations — there was ‘real inventiveness’120 
and, as such, the resulting product was deserving of protection.121 It was also 
acknowledged that where ‘definitive steps were taken such as cross-pollination of 
specific plants, the breeder really invents and comes within the statute’.122 For 
example, breeders who induced genetic mutations by exposing plants to radiation or 
abnormally high levels of fertiliser were considered to be inventors, because 
although they may not have been sure what the results of their experiments would 
turn out to be, they were ‘definitely experimenting and the product could hardly be 
called “natural’’’.123 This was the case with Plant Patent 165, which was for a pure 
white lily that had been developed by the General Electric Company. In developing 
the new plant, regal lily bulbs were exposed to a 30-minute dose of intense radia-
tion. The resulting plant invention, which was selected from a group of plants grown 
from the irradiated bulbs, did not shed pollen on the white petals. The result was a 
lily with pure white flowers, which was highly sought after by florists. The new lily, 
which was described as the first ‘artificial’ lily to be patented, was named the 
Röntgen regal lily (in honour of the inventor of X-rays, Wilhelm Konrad Rönt-
gen).124 Although critics of the plant patent scheme were willing to accept that 
breeders who developed plants such as the Röntgen regal lily qualified as inventors, 
most new varieties resulted from the chance discovery of a bud, sport or mutation.  
In October 1934, the question of what it meant to invent a plant was considered 
by the Northern District Court of Ohio in Cole Nursery,125 the first case brought 
under the Plant Patent Act of 1930. The case concerned an action for infringement 
of Plant Patent 110, which had been granted over an upright variety of Japanese 
barberry (Berberis thunbergii). According to the patent specification, the breeder 
grew Japanese barberry seedlings over five generations, selecting out the more 
upright plants at each stage to use as the basis to propagate the subsequent genera-
tion.126 In the sixth generation, the breeder obtained what he described as a perfectly 
 
275, 276. Since the asexual reproduction of a sport does not require invention, the reproduction does 
not make a new plant: Allyn, ‘Plant Patent Queries: A Patent Attorney’s Views on the Law’, 
above n 113, 56. 
119 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 316. 
120 Ibid 317. 
121 Ibid 318: ‘While a chance bud variation may be considered to be a natural product, a variety that 
represents years of application and a great number of experiments with different combinations of 
plants represents certainly an outcome that can hardly be considered “natural” by any reasonable 
test.’ 
122 Rossman, ‘The Preparation and Prosecution of Plant Patent Applications’, above n 59, 643. 
123 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 318. At the other extreme were ‘[n]ew forms produced 
by genetic analysis, and deliberate segregation and recombination of definite genes and chromo-
somes’ which were ‘even more the products of human skill and ingenuity’: Cook, ‘Patents for New 
Plants’, above n 87, 68. 
124 Goldsmith, above n 40, 151; ‘Keeping Pace with Science’ (1935) 120(11) The Literary Digest 
20, 20. 
125 17 F Supp 159, 159 (Jones J) (ND Ohio, 1936); Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent Decision’, 
above n 96, 187. 
126 Cole Nursery, 17 F Supp 159, 160 (Jones J) (ND Ohio, 1936). 
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vertical plant which formed the basis of the patented invention.127 In discussing the 
validity of the patent, the Court suggested that it was not willing to accept that a 
plant that arose as a result of ‘selecting and genetics’ over five generations could be 
classified as an invention.128 This was on the basis that ‘[t]he use of nature and 
knowledge of propagation of plant life [rather than human intervention] seem … to 
have been the forces behind the development of the upright variety of barberry.’129 
As Robert Cook noted at the time, the potential exclusion of plants developed 
through ‘a process of select[ing] and genetics’ from the remit of patentable subject 
matter had alarming consequences, not least because it would have endangered the 
validity of the vast majority of existing plant patents.130 This was particularly the 
case with the large number of plant patents that had been granted in relation to 
‘purely sporadic occurrences [such as sports and chance seedlings] over which the 
plant breeder ha[d] no control’.131  
One of the notable characteristics of these debates about the meaning of a plant 
invention was that they rehearsed arguments that had previously been aired in the 
context of utility patents, and which concerned the patentability of naturally 
occurring products. Discussions about the proper rationale of plant patents restated 
the old notion of manufacture by distinguishing between those plants which were 
products of nature (and which were therefore not patentable) and those which were 
products of human intervention (which were patentable). Arguments on all sides 
emphasised the role that human agency played in moulding a transcendent, 
pre-existing, and indisputable ‘nature’,132 and this basic asymmetry was reflected in 
the definition of an invention as ‘the adjustment of nature to human use or 
needs.’133 In this context, the main question for the law was how and when the gap 
between nature and invention was bridged. As one observer put it, ‘[u]nquestionably 
the genetic elements which go to make up a new form of plant are “natural”. Into 
which category of “naturalness” the courts will conclude that these phenomena of 
plants should be placed is an extremely interesting problem.’134 Although the 
regime of plant patents could have followed this lead and circled endlessly around 
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. See also at ibid: ‘I am not prepared to accord invention to the result produced by such uses 
in respect of the upright barberry; but if it were otherwise, the fact of the knowledge and exis-
tence of the plant prior to the amendment of May, 1930, and its prior public use, would fatally 
impair its validity’. 
130 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent Decision’, above n 96, 190. Cook estimated that between 79 and 
90 per cent of the (then) existing plant patents would have been declared invalid: at 192. 
131 Ibid 190. 
132 In these accounts the ‘opposition between nature and culture shadows that between the real and 
the constructed: nature stands for the eternal, the inexorable, the universal; culture for the vari-
able, the malleable, the particular’: Lorraine Daston, ‘The Coming into Being of Scientific 
Objects’ in Lorraine Daston (ed), Biographies of Scientific Objects (2000) 1, 3. 
133 See J H Simons, ‘Compounds as Inventions’ (1939) 21 Journal of the Patent Office Society 542, 
542. 
134 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 318. See also at 318: ‘It is a little hard to distinguish 
the natural property of tungsten that renders it ductile under certain conditions from the natural 
properties of carbon and hydrogen and oxygen that permit them to combine in various ways to 
form a vast array of patentable chemical compounds.’ 
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the question of how ‘natural’ plant inventions were,135 it chose instead to redefine 
the very notion of the invention. 
IV  REPRODUCING NATURE 
Whereas traditional utility patents were based on the assumption that the only 
actor able to exercise agency in relation to the development of a novel invention 
was the human inventor, the regime of plant patents acknowledged that nature 
played a key role in the creation of new plant varieties.136 Nature provided the 
buds, sports and mutations that formed the basis for plant inventions. Even 
where breeders were engaged in scientific breeding practices such as hybridisa-
tion, selection or the genetic modification of plants through exposure to radiation 
or high levels of fertilisation, the results were still seen as ‘fortuitous events over 
which the discoverer has no control.’137 That is, the resulting biological innova-
tions were seen to be the product of nature’s own inventive efforts rather than the 
skill and effort of a human inventor. The role that the non-human actor played in 
the creation of plant inventions was reflected in the comment that ‘plants are 
considerably different from machines, they are a direct product of lit-
tle-understood mother nature, and are not merely a creation of man’s mind.’138  
Although nature played an important role in initiating the development of plant 
inventions, it was unable to follow through and complete the inventive proc-
ess.139 More precisely, although nature created sports, buds and mutations, it was 
unable to reproduce or repeat these aberrations in subsequent generations.140 As 
the congressional Committee on Patents observed, ‘a plant discovery resulting 
from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be 
reproduced by nature unaided by man’.141 While the genome of a plant variety is 
replicated in processes of sexual reproduction, there is no guarantee that genetic 
deviations appearing in a particular plant will be replicated in its progeny. So 
 
135 For an example of the discussions about the changes needed to a crayfish for it to qualify as a 
manufacture: see Ex parte Grayson, 51 USPQ 413 (BPAI, 1941) (a shrimp with the head and 
digestive tract removed was not a manufacture; a thing occurring in nature, which is substan-
tially unaltered, is not a ‘manufacture’).  
136 Harry C Robb, ‘Plant Patents’ (1933) 15 Journal of the Patent Office Society 752, 753. 
137 Cook, ‘The Administration of the Plant Patent Law from the Breeder’s Point of View’, above n 
118, 281. For a discussion of the role of bud mutations (prompted in part by the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930): see A D Shamel and C S Pomeroy, ‘Bud Variations in Apples: A Study of the Role of 
Bud Mutation in Deciduous Fruit Improvement’ (1932) 23 Journal of Heredity 173. Shamel and 
Pomeroy also discuss the impact that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 had in fostering interest in 
bud variations: at 178. 
138 Langrock, above n 79, 788. See also Roger A McEowen, ‘Legal Issues Related to the Use and 
Ownership of Genetically Modified Organisms’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 611, 628: 
upon passage of the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act in 1930, Congress attempted to address 
these widely held beliefs ‘by explaining that the work of the plant breeder “in aid of nature” 
should be subject to patent protection’; House of Representatives Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 8; Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 6. 
139 A bud sport was ‘a gift of nature, yes, but not a gift of nature to mankind, generally’: Robb, 
above n 136, 760. 
140 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 5: ‘They could not have been 
reproduced true to type by nature through seedlings’; Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 4. 
See also Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 18. 
141 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 7; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 6. See also Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 15. 
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although an infinite number of sports might appear on a tree or plant, it was 
highly unlikely that these would be repeated in subsequent generations, which in 
turn meant that the particular variety would survive for considerably less time 
than the patent term of 17 years. 
It was at this point that the skill of the breeder was called upon to finalise the 
process that nature had begun but could not complete on its own. In assisting in 
the creation of plant inventions, the breeder was assigned two specific tasks. The 
first was to recognise the potential value of nature’s creations. This was explic-
itly acknowledged in the Plant Patent Act of 1930 which said that to be protected 
as a plant patent, a plant variety had to be invented or discovered.142 Here, the 
‘art of the breeder’ was to know ‘what to look for, and in having the interest to 
look; and in skill and persistence in the making of crosses.’143 Once a novel bud, 
sport or mutation had been discovered, the next task of the breeder was to 
asexually reproduce (or clone) the genetic aberration, which, as we have seen, 
was an essential condition of patentability. In this sense, the role of the breeder 
(and the law) was to normalise the abnormal, to stabilise and standardise nature’s 
deviants, mutations and aberrations,144 to ‘save this freak or abnormality in plant 
life to make it useful to mankind’.145 This proposition was reflected in the way 
that the invention was construed for the purposes of the novelty examination. In 
Yoder Brothers, it was held that 
for a plant to have ‘existed’ before in nature, we think that it must have been 
capable of reproducing itself. Thus, we have concluded that the mere fact that a 
sport of a plant had appeared before in the past would not be sufficient to pre-
clude the patentability of the plant on novelty grounds, since each sport is a 
one-time phenomenon absent human intervention.146 
The requirement of asexual reproduction ensured that a variety that might 
otherwise have been lost forever was preserved for future generations.147 The 
fact that the plant invention would not have recurred in nature without the efforts 
of the breeder meant that the plant invention was simultaneously both natural 
and artificial. Importantly, the fact that the plant invention as reproduced by the 
breeder did not exist — or persist — in a natural state meant, at least for patent 
law purposes, that it was not a product of nature and thus potentially patentable. 
In recognising the positive role that nature plays in the creation of plant inven-
tions, plant patent law reconfigured the concept of invention. This inverted 
relationship between ideas and their material reproduction was reflected in a 
 
142 Plant Patent Act, 35 USC § 161 (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
143 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’, above n 87, 319. The plant originator must ‘recognise the new and 
appreciate its possibilities’: Magnuson, above n 58, 496. 
144 See, eg, Kim Bros v Hagler, 167 F Supp 665 (SD Cal, 1958); affd 276 F 2d 259 (9th Cir, 1960). 
145 Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 13. 
146 537 F 2d 1347, 1377 fn 34 (Goldberg J) (5th Cir, 1976). 
147 Robb, above n 136, 753. See also House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 
5; Senate Committee on Patents, above n 43, 6; Ex parte Moore, 115 USPQ 145 (BPAI, 1957); 
Rossman, ‘The Preparation and Prosecution of Plant Patent Applications’, above n 59, 633. In 
this sense, the plant patent scheme not only provided an incentive to invest in breeding (which is 
the justification usually given for patent protection), but also encouraged the reproduction and 
preservation of genetic diversity — an issue addressed by the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 142 (entered into force 29 December 1993). 
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crucial doctrinal revision, which centred on the distinction between conception 
and reduction to practice. The difficulty was addressed in the decision of the US 
Patent Office Tribunal in Dunn v Ragin v Carlile.148 The question in the case was 
who should be recognised as the ‘inventor’ of a new variety of seedless pineap-
ple orange. Arthur A Dunn was the owner of the land upon which the parent tree 
had been discovered.149 He claimed to be entitled to a patent on the bases that he 
had conceived the existence of the tree by observing it over the course of seven 
years, and that his agent had propagated cuttings from the tree.150 Robert Lee 
Ragin, to whom Dunn had given permission to cut wood upon his land, identi-
fied the seedless orange tree and reproduced it through a number of genera-
tions.151 He showed the trees to a state nursery inspector, whose evidence 
affirmed that by the summer of 1936, Ragin had asexually reproduced trees 
bearing seedless fruit.152 Meanwhile, even on the basis of questionable evidence, 
Dunn could only establish that his agent had reproduced the tree in the summer 
of 1938.153 This gave rise to the question of what was the proper test of inventor-
ship under the Plant Patent Act of 1930, which required applicants to show that 
they had invented or discovered, and asexually reproduced the plant in ques-
tion.154 
The Tribunal started from the premise that ‘an invention comprises two main 
inventive acts, conception and reduction to practice’.155 Ordinarily, the latter 
would follow the former; but, unlike mechanical inventions, plant inventions 
were not the products of a prior design, so the moment of conception was ‘not so 
readily determined’.156 To resolve this difficulty, the Tribunal adopted the 
approach pioneered in relation to chemical inventions, holding that the ‘concep-
tion or discovery of the new variety … must occur concurrently with the actual 
reduction to practice’.157 Based on this revised definition, the Tribunal held that 
where an invention was derived by cloning a bud variation or sport, the concep-
tion of the invention ‘must reside in the discovery of the new variety. A new 
variety may popularly be said to be conceived or discovered when an individual 
becomes aware of its existence.’158 Given that bud variations could turn out to be 
either effects of environment or ‘inherent’ and reproducible traits, the nature of 
what was discovered or ‘conceived’ could only be established by reproducing the 
‘parent’ plant: the ‘ultimate proof’ of conception was ‘actual propagation’, or 
reduction to practice. So in respect of the seedless pineapple orange, the inven-
tion was deemed to have been reduced to practice at the point ‘when by asexual 
 
148 50 USPQ 472 (BPAI, 1941). 
149 Ibid [8]. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid [9]. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 See generally Bourne v Jones, 114 F Supp 413 (SD Fla, 1951); affd 207 F 2d 173 (5th Cir, 
1953); cert denied 346 US 897 (1953). 
155 Dunn v Ragin v Carlile, 50 USPQ 472 (BPAI, 1941) [2]. 
156 Ibid. 
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reproduction citrus trees would be established which bore fruits having all the 
attributes of the variety known as a pineapple orange with the exception of its 
habit of containing seeds’.159 It followed that Ragin was the inventor because he 
was the first person to have reproduced the new variety asexually.160 
In this representation of biological invention, the task of the breeder was to 
identify and then preserve, capture and retain what nature had spontaneously 
created but was unable to repeat unaided. Given this, it might be tempting to 
think of the role played by the breeder in plant patent law as patent law’s 
analogue of neighbouring rights protection in copyright law, where the rationale 
for the grant of protection is not, as it is with most other forms of intellectual 
property, to encourage the creation of new cultural objects so much as to 
encourage third parties to bring objects that have already been created to 
market.161 But this would not be an accurate reflection of plant patent law, not 
least because it fails to capture the important way in which the invention was 
reconfigured. In a sense, plant patent law saw the breeder and nature as some-
thing like joint inventors of a new variety. It was only when the skill and effort of 
the two were combined that a plant invention was ever able to come into 
existence. In this particular association of humans and nonhumans,162 neither 
nature nor breeders could operate independently of each other to develop a novel 
plant invention.163 Indeed, as the US Commissioner of Patents observed, the 
‘part played by nature and man’ in the development of new plant varieties 
‘cannot be completely separated or weighed or credited to one or the other’.164 
By altering the concept of agency that underpins the inventive process, plant 
patent law fundamentally changed the way that the invention was configured. In 
particular, whereas mechanical inventors were inventors at the beginning, 
breeders were inventors after the fact. One of the consequences of this is that 
breeders did not create a new genetic principle — instead, they inductively 
appropriated a natural event. This changed the premise of invention so that it 
became an inductive rather than an originating act. 
At the same time as it altered the notion of agency that underpinned the inven-
tive process, plant patent law also reversed the roles normally played by the 
participants involved in the creation of the invention. Under traditional patent 
doctrine, nature provides the material which is shaped into an invention by the 
human inventor. In the case of plant patents, nature did the inventing, and the 
 
159 Ibid. 
160 Robert Starr Allyn, ‘Patentable Yardsticks’ (1943) 25 Journal of the Patent Office Society 791, 
816. 
161 This is a consequence of the way that subject matter other than works (or entrepreneurial works) 
is treated within copyright law: see Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 
(2nd ed, 2004) 30. 
162 This was particularly the case with practising lawyers. For example, Allyn (an attorney from New 
York) refused to accept the creative role that nature played in the development of plant inventions — 
‘it is difficult to see how there could be a joint invention of a plant’: Allyn, The First Plant Patents, 
above n 56, 35. 
163 Burbank, above n 101, 365–6. See also Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 18: ‘Nature in such 
instances, unaided by man, does not reproduce the new variety true to type.’ 
164 Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 18. 
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breeder was relegated to the task of identifying and then reproducing nature’s 
creations. 
When the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was passed, its reversal of these previously 
well-established roles gave rise to a concern that patentees, who were given the 
exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention, might have found it difficult 
to prove infringement. Anticipating the question which the Canadian Supreme 
Court found so difficult in Schmeiser,165 commentators were concerned that ‘the 
asexual reproduction of a plant might not be construed as “making” of the 
invention by the infringer since “nature” plays a vital part in the making of a 
plant’.166 This was because the term ‘make’ as used in the US Patent Act was 
‘understood to mean construction by human activity whereas these plants are 
reproduced by growth, a person only putting the graft or scion, for example, in 
such a position, in the tree to be grafted upon, that it will grow.’167 To remedy 
this problem, the rights given to plant patentees under the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 were extended to include the exclusive right to asexually reproduce the 
plant throughout the US.168 
The decision to limit plant patent protection to asexually reproducing plants — 
which was reportedly taken on the advice of various agricultural scientists and 
was seen by many to be a temporary aberration that would be addressed as soon 
as other problems with the Plant Patent Act of 1930 had been resolved169 — 
meant that protection did not extend to plants that reproduced sexually by means 
of seeds.170 The argument was that when a new plant was reproduced by seed, 
the desirable characteristics found in the parent would ‘divide up among the 
offspring with mathematical exactness as determined in Mendel’s law of 
heredity, and others produced by the chance union of complementary mendeliz-
ing “factors,” will not reappear in the progeny.’171 The problem, in short, was 
that the characteristics of a sexually reproduced plant changed from generation 
to generation, making patent protection difficult, if not impossible.172 By 
contrast with asexually reproduced plants, sexually reproduced plants could not 
be seen as manufactures. Or, to put the same point the other way around, it was 
precisely because patent protection was limited to asexually reproduced plants 
that the analogy between organisms and manufactures could be sustained. This 
 
165 [2004] 1 SCR 902. 
166 Allyn, The First Plant Patents, above n 56, 44.  
167 Memorandum from Thomas E Robertson (Commissioner of Patents) to Robert P Lamont 
(Secretary of Commerce), 8 March 1930, reproduced in Allyn, The First Plant Patents, 
above n 56, 70. 
168 35 USC § 163 (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
169 Cook, ‘Patents for New Plants’, above n 87, 66. It was intended that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 
would eventually be extended to all plants and domestic animals: at 66. 
170 John G Townsend Jr, ‘The Importance of Plant Patents to Agriculture: Statement by Hon John G 
Townsend Jr, United States Senator from Delaware’ (1930) 38 National Nurseryman: For Grow-
ers and Dealers in Nursery Stock 5, 17. See also Langrock, above n 79, 787. 
171 Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 13; Rossman, ‘The Preparation and Prosecution of Plant 
Patent Applications’, above n 59, 633. Rossman also said that another reason why protection did 
not extend to sexual reproduction was because the seed (grain) was an article of commerce: see 
Rossman, ‘Plant Patents’, above n 98, 16. 
172 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 4; Senate Committee on Patents, 
above n 43, 3; Langrock, above n 79, 788. 
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was a crucial point as it facilitated the holding in Chakrabarty that there was no 
categorical difference between organisms and manufactures.173 
V  DISCLOSING NATURE 
In the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the difference between utility patents and plant 
patents was represented in the decision to limit protection to asexually repro-
duced plants174 and the relaxation of the written description requirement.175 With 
respect to the latter point, the question arose as to how new plant varieties were 
to be described and distinguished for the purposes of patent protection. Some 
commentators argued in favour of the introduction of ‘type plants’ as a part of 
the registration process. This would have required applicants to deposit physical 
copies of their plant invention which would have been preserved and maintained 
in dedicated farms, gardens and herbariums.176 For example, in an open letter to 
the US Commissioner of Patents, Cook called for the deposit of type plants to be 
made a condition of patentability (similar to the discarded practice of requiring 
patentees to deposit a model of their mechanical inventions as a condition of 
grant).177 It was believed that type plants, which would remain the actual living 
embodiment of what was patented, would solve some of the difficulties of the 
plant patent system.178 In particular, it was thought that the type plant would 
provide a precise and accurate basis to determine the novelty and distinctiveness 
of new plants. It was also believed that an officially sanctioned physical repre-
sentation of the invention would have made it easier to decide questions of 
infringement. However, given that the US Patent Office had long since ceased to 
require inventors to submit models with their patent applications, and the 
expense of maintaining a collection of type plants,179 it is not surprising that 
these proposals were rejected. But as a result, registration became a paper-based 
exercise. While the US Commissioner of Patents had (and still has) the ability to 
require applicants to submit specimens of a patented invention,180 this was used 
to supplement rather than replace the patent specification. 
 
173 447 US 303, 303 (1980). 
174 Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub L No 245, § 1, 46 Stat 376. For the current version: see 35 USC 
§ 161 (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
175 Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub L No 245, § 2, 46 Stat 376. For the current version: see 35 USC 
§ 162 (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
176 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent Decision’, above n 96, 192.  
177 Letter from Robert Cook to the Commissioner of Patents, 18 November 1932, reproduced in 
Cook, ‘Other Plant Patents’, above n 114, 50: ‘In the last analysis a plant patent must refer back 
to an actual living plant; no drawings and descriptions can take the place of this’; Robert Cook, 
‘Three More Plant Patents: Plant Patents 2, 3, and 4 Issued — Patent Drawings in Color — Need 
for Type Plant Emphasized — Contrasts between Mechanical and Botanical Inventions’ (1931) 
22 Journal of Heredity 369, 369: ‘The only hope of attaining reality in plant-variety determina-
tion is to refer back to definite type-plants.’ 
178 Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent Decision’, above n 96, 192. 
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‘Administration of Law to Patent Plants Said to Offer Many Perplexing Problems’, The United 
States Daily, 18 June 1930, 4. 
180 Allyn, The First Plant Patents, above n 56, 24: ‘Sections 4890 and 4891 RS provide that the 
Commissioner of Patents may require specimens of ingredients for experiment — in the case of 
compositions — and models of devices which admit of representation’. See also Rossman, ‘The 
Preparation and Prosecution of Plant Patent Applications’, above n 59, 640: specimens of plants 
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In a utility patent, the specification performs two functions, which are fulfilled 
by the distinct elements of the claim and the disclosure. The claim defines and 
delimits the intangible object claimed by the inventor and distinguishes it from 
the prior art base — the terms of the claim define what will count as an in-
fringement of the patent in any subsequent dispute.181 The statutory requirement 
of disclosure articulates three distinct rules: 
1 the written description requirement, according to which the inventor should 
state ‘what the invention is’;182 
2 the enablement requirement, which should enable those skilled in the art to 
‘make and use’ the invention;183 and 
3 the best mode requirement, which prescribes that the inventor should 
disclose the optimal known embodiment of the invention.184 
These principles reflect the modern paradigm of invention, and more precisely, 
the notion that an invention consists in an idea that has a force and consistency 
apart from the artefacts in which it is embodied. 
Although this sense of invention now seems almost self-evident, it was the 
outcome of a gradual process of evolution. In early modern Europe, novelty was 
a jurisdictional quality, both in the sense that it was relative to a particular 
territorial field, and in the sense that patents were granted by sovereign pa-
trons.185 An invention was new if it was new to the realm, and sovereigns 
rewarded industrial espionage as much as independent experimentation.186 
‘Originality’, by contrast, was construed by reference to a universal field of 
technical and scientific knowledge.187 An invention was new if it was previously 
undocumented in the archives of Western knowledge.188 But the conception of 
inventions as ideas also presupposed a change in the mode of production of 
technical artefacts, from an economy of guilds to an economy of industrial 
manufacture in which ‘[a]lmost unlimited pains are … bestowed upon the 
original, from which a series of copies is to be produced; and the larger the 
number of these copies, the more care and pains can the manufacturer afford to 
lavish upon the original’.189 The inventive ‘idea’ became the original template or 
design from which a succession of identical exemplars were produced, economic 
value being concentrated in the (patented) idea rather than its material embodi-
ments.190 Finally, the construction of the invention as an ‘idea’ presupposed the 
development of a patent bureaucracy in which inventions could be turned into 
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textual form, and scrutinised or transmitted independently of their material 
embodiments. As Mario Biagioli observes, the 19th century was the period in 
which ‘the “inventive idea” moved into the halls of soon-to-be-established patent 
offices to become the primary focus of patent practice, while its material 
embodiments stayed outside, in the world of manufacture and commerce’.191 
Held in its textual body, the inventive idea retains the power to ‘inform’ the 
construction of material artefacts, and the statutory requirement that the inven-
tion be disclosed in writing presupposes this ability to disclose and communicate 
a genetic idea through textual embodiments. 
The experience of interpreting and applying the Plant Patent Act of 1930 
brought with it an awareness of the difference between the functions of the 
specification of a utility patent and those of a plant patent. The difference was 
clearly made in Application of LeGrice, where the question before the US Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals was whether the publication in England of colour 
pictures depicting two rose varieties barred the breeder-inventor from patenting 
them in the US on the basis that the photographs had placed them in the public 
domain.192 The question was whether a photograph was an ‘enabling description’ 
of the varieties.193 Starting from the premise that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was 
designed to eliminate ‘discrimination … between plant inventors and industrial 
inventors’, the Court held that a written or pictorial description did not put the 
public ‘in possession’ of the invention in the sense required by the Patent Act of 
1952.194 In making this decision, the Court cited195 the observation in 
Dunn v Ragin v Carlile  that 
the mere filing of an application for a patent for a new variety of plant would 
not enable anyone to reproduce such a plant. The plant must actually be in be-
ing and reproductions thereof must be obtainable by one of the usual forms of 
asexual reproduction such as grafting, budding, inarching, division or the 
like.196 
In the case of manufactures, the written description (supplemented by the 
knowledge of the skilled artisan) could enable an artefact to be reproduced, but a 
written description of a plant could not have this ontogenetic capacity: 
Should a plant variety become extinct one cannot deliberately produce a dupli-
cate even though its ancestry and the techniques of cross-pollination be known. 
Manufactured articles, processes, and chemical compositions when disclosed 
are, however, susceptible to man-made duplication.197 
 
191 Ibid 1144. 
192 301 F 2d 929 (CCPA, 1962). 
193 Ibid 929. 
194 Ibid 933 (Smith J). The phrasing was taken from the congressional Patent Committee Reports. 
The Court cited the following passage from the reports: ‘No one has advanced a just and logical 
reason why reward for service to the public should be extended to the inventor of a mechanical 
toy and denied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given a valuable new 
variety of fruit or other plant to mankind’: at 932 (Smith J). 
195 Ibid 932–3 (Smith J). 
196 Dunn v Ragin v Carlile, 50 USPQ 472, 474 (1941). 
197 Application of LeGrice, 301 F 2d 929, 935 (Smith J) (CCPA, 1962). 
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To reproduce a plant, one needed to ‘possess’ the thing itself. This was recog-
nised by an argument aired in Application of LeGrice, that the patent text had the 
secondary but essential effect of making the material form of a new variety plant 
available to the public: 
A plant patent performs its function by making it profitable to the developer to 
make as wide a distribution as possible of the res, the plant itself.… Publicity 
informs the public where specimens exist. This is how a plant patent adds to the 
store of useful knowledge.198 
This is akin to more recent interpretations of the written description requirement 
in the context of biotechnological inventions,199 which no longer see the textu-
ally-embodied idea as having ontogenetic force. In the case of deposited speci-
mens of gene sequences, the function ascribed to the textual description is no 
longer that of representing an intangible scheme or concept, and communicating 
that scheme or concept to the ‘public’, but rather to signpost the location of 
material from which the invention can be elicited. The ‘description’ in question 
is effectively just a set of accession numbers to the public depository, or the first 
link in an instrumental chain that would allow a competitor to ‘obtain the 
claimed sequences from the ATCC [American Tissue Culture Collection] 
depository by following the appropriate techniques to excise the nucleotide 
sequences from the deposited organisms containing those sequences.’200 This 
was the original basis for relaxing the disclosure requirement in the case of plant 
patents — Congress conceded that ‘intellectual possession’, or the ability to 
provide a recipe for the fabrication of the artefact, mattered less than the physical 
possession of the biological ‘means of production’.201 The physical nature of the 
plant invention was also reflected in the fact that to prove infringement, a patentee 
had to show a physical taking from the patented plant.202 In part, the reason why 
plant patents are unable to be separated or decoupled from the physical invention 
can be traced to the way that the plant inventions are generated. While originat-
ing inventions, which consist of an idea that is subsequently reduced to practice 
(or at least can be presented as if they followed this trajectory), are able to be 
translated into and out of a written form, this is not the case with plant inven-
tions. 
 
198 Ibid 934–5 (Smith J). The Court in Application of LeGrice did, however, anticipate the argument 
in Chakrabarty: ‘we must be mindful of the scientific efforts which are daily adding to the store 
of knowledge in the fields of plant heredity and plant eugenics which one skilled in this art will 
be presumed to possess’: at 939 (Smith J).  
199 Enzo Biochem Inc v Gen-Probe Inc, 323 F 3d 956 (Fed Cir, 2002). 
200 Ibid 966 (Lourie J).  
201 House of Representatives Committee on Patents, above n 43, 7–10; Senate Committee on 
Patents, above n 43, 6–9. 
202 Imazio Nursery v Dania Greenhouses, 69 F 3d 1560, 1569–70 (Rich J) (Fed Cir, 1995). See also 
Application of LeGrice, 301 F 2d 929, 935 (Smith J) (CCPA, 1962) noting ‘that there are inher-
ent differences between plants and manufactured articles’, observing, in particular, that ‘should a 
plant variety become extinct, one cannot deliberately produce a duplicate even though its ances-
try and the techniques of cross-pollination be known.’ 
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VI  CONCLUSION 
The decision of the US Supreme Court in Funk Bros Seed Co v Kalo Inoculant 
Co is routinely cited as authority for the epigrammatic proposition advanced by 
the majority that ‘patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of 
nature … they are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of the laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.’203 
However, read as a whole, the decision reflects the complexities and indeter-
minacies of the notion of products of nature. In a concurring judgment, Frank-
furter J observed that references to ‘products of nature’ or ‘laws of nature’ were 
too ambiguous to serve as exclusionary criteria of patentability: 
Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’ and any pat-
entable composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of nature.’ Arguments 
drawn from such terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed 
to challenge almost every patent.204 
Both dissenting judgments argued that the problem lay not in the distinction 
between ‘discoveries’ and ‘inventions’, but the question of description and 
enablement. Whereas Frankfurter J considered that organisms were not properly 
identifiable, Burton J (dissenting) drew on the experience of plant patents to 
argue that the mode of description should follow the nature of the invention: 
Machines lend themselves readily to descriptions in terms of mechanical prin-
ciples and physical characteristics. … [I]t may be that a combination of strains 
of bacterial species, which strains are distinguished from one another and rec-
ognized in practice solely by their observed effects, can be definable reasona-
bly only in terms of those effects.205 
Accordingly, the question was not whether the inventor could provide an enabling 
description but whether they could ‘identify and use the [bacterial] strains in the 
manner described in the patent.’206 
In some sense, the dissenting judgments recapitulate the conceptual manoeuvre 
performed by the Plant Patent Act of 1930, which reconstituted the three cardinal 
elements of the modern notion of invention: origination, description and reproduc-
tion. In the logic of modern patent law, ingenuity is original — or originating — 
in the sense that it entirely controls the form, structure and articulation of the 
artefacts in which it is embodied. Thus, ingenuity can be reduced to textual form 
without losing any of its ‘genetic’ potency and it forms a design whose exem-
plars can be reproduced in multiple copies by means of a process of industrial 
manufacture.207 In the scheme of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 as it evolved in the 
years after 1930, the work of the invention was no longer that of imagining an 
originating or ontogenetic cause; it consisted instead in eliciting and stabilising 
effects whose causes could not be known and described. Thus, the central limitation 
 
203 333 US 127, 130 (Douglas J) (1948). 
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205 Ibid 136–7. 
206 Ibid 137 (Burton J). 
207 See Pottage and Sherman, above n 36. 
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of the Act, which restricted patents to asexually-reproduced plants, became the very 
premise that made this new mode of invention seem like a variation on the more 
established paradigm of originating invention. From this perspective, one can get a 
better understanding of the terms that have informed the accommodation within 
the patent system of plant inventions and biological inventions more generally. 
As commentators noted at the time, the characterisation of breeders as inventors 
within plant patent law constituted ‘a drastic revision of … what constitutes 
inventive faculty’.208 Subsequent developments have shown that it also added new 
and still unresolved complications to the problems of defining this ‘inventive 
faculty’. 
 
208 Robert C Cook, ‘The First Plant Patent’ (1932) 14 Journal of the Patent Office Society 398, 400 
(emphasis added). 
